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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to analyze how competitive forces
may inuence how media rms like TV channels raise revenue. A media rm can
either be nanced by advertising revenue, by direct payment from the viewers (or
the readers, if we consider newspapers), or by both. It is shown that the less
di¤erentiated the media rmscontent, the larger is the fraction of their revenue
that comes from advertising. If the number of media rms increases, on the other
hand, direct payment from the media consumers becomes more important. We also
show that advertising prices are strategic substitutes, which implies that competition
in advertising prices is distinctly di¤erent from price competition in other markets.
1 Introduction
Commercial media rms have chosen various business models for raising revenue.
Some TV channels are nanced by advertising revenues, while others rely on direct
payment from the viewers. Media rms also combine di¤erent ways of raising rev-
enue, such as when newspapers earn revenue both from advertising and from direct
payment from readers. What determines which business model media rms choose
for raising revenue?
The purpose of this article is to show that competition and strategic interactions
between media rms may be decisive for their choice of nancing. To capture the
role of competition, we allow both the degree of content di¤erentiation between the
media rmsproducts and the number of media rms to vary (e.g. the number of
newspapers or TV channels). We assume that the media rms choose consumer
prices and the ad price per viewer (or per reader, if we consider newspapers) non-
cooperatively. We further assume that the media consumers dislike advertising, at
least on the margin.1
In our analysis we nd that the toughness of the competition has an ambiguous
e¤ect on the nancing of media rms. If the competitive pressure increases because
the TV channels o¤er less di¤erentiated content, they will rely more on advertising
revenues. If the number of rivals increases, on the other hand, they will rely more
on direct payment from the media consumers.
1Even if media consumers dislike advertising on the margin, they may prefer some advertising
over none, particularly if we consider informative advertising in newspapers. It is well documented
that viewers try to avoid advertising breaks on TV, see Moriarty and Everett (1994) and Danaher
(1995). See also Wilbur (2008), who estimates a model of TV competition and nds viewers
disutility to be signicant and positive. For printed newspapers, there are less clear answers as to
whether consumers consider advertising as a good or a bad, and there are some indications that
the extent to which people consider commercials as bad varies across countries. For instance, it has
been argued that newspaper readers in Europe have a more negative attitude to advertising than
those in the USA (Gabszewicz et al., 2004a). Depken and Wilsons (2004) study of US magazines
indicates that readers attitude to advertising is negative for some magazines and positive for
others. Note that this is not inconsistent with our assumption that on the margin, consumers
dislike advertising.
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To understand these results, consider two or more TV channels which are so
di¤erentiated that they have (close to) monopoly power in their own viewer seg-
ments. This market power can utilized to set high consumer prices. However, if
the di¤erentiation between the TV channels is reduced, each will have incentives to
lower its consumer price in order to attract viewers from its rivals (demand becomes
more elastic). Better substitutability between the channels thereby puts a down-
ward pressure on viewer charges. Actually, they will not be able to set consumer
prices higher than marginal costs if the viewers perceive the channels as perfect
substitutes (and the rms have equal marginal costs). We therefore arrive at the
standard textbook result that revenue from consumer payments is monotonically
decreasing in the substitutability between the products.
The same is not true as regards revenue from the advertising market. The reason
for this is that the advertisers consider each channel as a bottleneck for accessing
that channels viewers. This means that even undi¤erentiated TV channels have an
individual market power which enables any of them to charge a higher advertising
price than its rivals and still face positive demand for advertising. It will thus never
be optimal for the media rms to set the advertising price equal to marginal costs.
Note also that the benet of reaching a viewer with an ad is independent of how
di¤erentiated the audience considers the TV channels to be. Contrary to what is the
case with consumer payments, a smaller channel di¤erentiation will therefore not
reduce advertising revenue, other things equal. Indeed, we show that the opposite
is true; the less di¤erentiated the channels are from the audiencepoint of view, the
higher the revenue from advertising.
Next, suppose that the number of TV channels increases. The viewers will then
be spread out over a larger number of channels, giving each of them a smaller
audience. This, in turn, reduces any individual TV channels market power in the
advertising market. As the number of TV channels increases, the price each of them
can charge for ads approaches marginal costs. But if the consumers consider the
new channels as di¤erent from those which are already in the market, each channel
will still have some market power in the viewer market, and will therefore always be
able to make a positive prot from direct consumer payments. Our model thereby
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predicts that consumer payments are a relatively more important source of revenue
the larger the number of TV channels.
Our predictions are consistent with casual observations from several media mar-
kets. The total number of printed newspapers has gone down the last couple of
decades, while at the same time we have witnessed an increase in the number of
purely advertising-nanced newspapers. This indicates that a reduction in the num-
ber of printed newspapers has led to a larger fraction of their revenues being gen-
erated by advertising. In the TV market we observe the opposite. The number
of commercial TV channels has increased, and direct payments from the viewers
have become more and more important relative to advertising revenues. Moreover,
as noted by Godes et al. (2008), we have witnessed that as the number of online
content providers has increased, direct consumer payments on the internet have be-
come more prevalent. Casual observations also indicate that the newspapers and TV
channels which are most di¤erentiated from their rivals, are the ones who are best
able to charge the consumers. This is most obvious on the internet; a high reliance
on ad revenue seems to be the only viable business model for electronic newspapers
which cannot o¤er unique content.
Finally, our model predicts that media rms that are mainly advertising-nanced
have relatively large audiences. Again, competition is the driving force. To see
why, consider two competing TV channels that for some reason have become less
di¤erentiated with respect to the content they o¤er. Then, as argued above, we
should expect them to set a lower consumer price and have more ads than what
was initially the case. In isolation, the latter has a negative e¤ect on the size of
the audience if the public dislikes ads. However, the fact that the channels have
become less di¤erentiated also implies that they have lost some market power over
the consumers. They must therefore sell their products at more favorable terms,
which means that the positive e¤ect of a lower direct charge must dominate over
the negative e¤ect of a larger ad volume from the consumerspoint of view. Thus,
the size of the audience increases. This prediction is consistent with the observation
that pay-TV channels and newspapers with few close substitutes typically have high
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prices and small audiences.2
Several studies of the media industry focus on program scheduling, and, in par-
ticular, on the well-known lead-ine¤ect (see, for example, Rust and Eechanbaldi,
1989, and Schachar and Emerson, 2000).3 Other studies are concerned with the
choice of programming, i.e., what programs to produce (see, for example, Liu et al.,
2004).4 However, none of these studies models the choice of advertising by media
rms. More recently, there have been some studies that analyze advertising deci-
sions by media rms.5 The choice of nancing - advertising versus direct payment -
has not been an issue in these articles.
The only paper we are aware of, besides ours, that considers media rms which
are partly nanced by advertising and partly by consumer payments, is Godes et
al. (2008).6 However, they have a di¤erent model set-up and focus. They analyze
competition between di¤erent media industries, e.g. newspaper and TV, an issue
that is not raised in our article. In addition, they analyze duopolistic competition
between media rms in the same industry. The unique contribution of their work
is to show the impact of competition on the media rmsincentives to underprice
2Chae and Flores (1998) analyze how we should expect pay TV and advertising-nanced TV
to di¤er on certain main characteristics of the programmes they o¤er. Their main result is that
pay TV tends to show programs for which there is a relatively small audience, but with a high
willingness to pay. Advertising-nanced TV, on the other hand, focuses on large markets where
the audience has a relatively low willingness to pay. Chae and Flores thus focus purely on the
demand side to explain how media rms are nanced, while we take into account the two-sidedness
of the media industries in our analysis.
3Lead-inrefers to TV stations that air popular programs early in the evening to attract viewers
who then continue to watch their channels for the rest of the evening. This topic is also studied in
Goettler and Schachar (2001) and Rust and Alpert (1984). See also Nilssen and Sørgard (1998),
where the program scheduling of news for two competing TV channels is analyzed.
4For a debate concerning their results, see Chou and Wu (2006) and Liu et al. (2006). Pro-
gramming has been an issue in the media-economics literature for a long time, see for example
Steiner (1952), Beebe (1977) and Spence and Owen (1977).
5See Dukes and Gal-Or (2003), Barros et al. (2004), Gabszewicz et al. (2004b), Anderson and
Coate (2005), Gal-Or and Dukes (2006) and Kind et al. (2007).
6Peitz and Valletti (2008) analyze competition between pay-TV and pure free-to-air in a setting
where they assume that the latter cannot charge the viewers.
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- i.e., set a low price on contents in order to attract consumers and thereby earn
more from advertising. Underpricing can take place in our model as well, but this is
not our focus. Instead we set up a model with oligopolistic rather than duopolistic
competition, and complement the work by Godes et al. by focusing on how the
mix between revenues from advertising and direct consumer payment depends on
both the number of media products and their substitutability. Additionally, both
Godes et al. and our paper consider the e¤ect of a change in market structure from
monopoly to dupoly. However, it turns out that moving from monopoly to duopoly
has qualitatively di¤erent e¤ects than those of moving from duopoly to oligopoly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our model,
and we report our results in Section 3. We rst show that while price competition
is a harsh form of competition in the consumer market, it is relatively weak in the
advertising market. Secondly, we discuss the role of product di¤erentiation and the
number of rms in explaining the nancing of media rms. Finally, in Section 4, we
o¤er some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a media industry where the media rms choose to earn revenue solely
from the advertising market (traditional free-to-air TV and free newspapers), solely
from consumer payments (e.g. pure pay-TV), or from a combination of these two
sources. There are m  2 competing media rms, and each media rm is o¤ering
one media product. The advertising level in media product i = 1; :::;m is denoted
Ai; and consumer demand is denoted Ci. The advertisers and consumers are charged
unit prices equal to ri and pi; respectively. We disregard any production costs, such
that the prot level of media rm i is
i = piCi + riAi; i = 1; ::;m: (1)
There is a continuum of identical consumers with measure one, and we follow
Kind et al. (2007) in assuming that consumer preferences are given by the Shubik-
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Levitan utility function (see Shubik and Levitan, 1980):
U =
mX
i=1
Ci   1
2
24m (1  s) mX
i=1
(Ci)
2 + s
 
mX
i=1
Ci
!235 : (2)
The parameter s 2 [0; 1) is a measure of product di¤erentiation: The higher s, the
closer substitutes the media products are from the consumerspoint of view. The
Shubik-Levitan formulation ensures that the parameter s only captures product
di¤erentiation and has no e¤ect on market size.7
Consumer surplus depends on the price pi that the consumers are charged for
the media product (e.g. per copy of a newspaper). In addition it depends on the
level of advertising, unless the consumers are indi¤erent to ads. To capture this
dependency, we let the subjective consumer cost for each unit of media product i
be (pi + iAi), where i measures the consumersdisutility of the ads. Consumer
surplus is thus given by
CS = U  
mX
i=1
(pi + iAi)Ci:
In principle, i might be a function of the advertising level in media product i:
We could for instance assume that consumers have positive utility of ads (i < 0)
for relatively small advertising levels (e.g. because ads inform newspaper readers
about retail prices at local stores), but that they perceive ads to be a nuisance
if the advertising level becomes su¢ ciently large: In the former case iAi may be
perceived as a negative indirect price for media products i, and in the latter case
as a positive indirect price. For the majority of media products it is reasonable to
assume that consumers perceive ads as a bad on the margin. In order to highlight
the fact that the media rmschoice of direct prices (pi) and indirect prices (iAi)
depend crucially on the competitive pressure, we let i be positive and constant, and
have the same value for each media product in the industry we consider; i   _i:8
7Note that this is in contrast to the standard quadratic utility function, where the same para-
meter measures both product di¤erentiation and market size. See Motta (2004) for details.
8Our framework is not well suited for analyzing competition between di¤erent media industries.
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By setting dCS=dCi = 0, we then nd that consumer demand for media product i
equals
Ci =
1
m

1  Ai   sA
1  s  
pi   sp
1  s

; i = 1; :::;m; (3)
where A = 1
m
Pm
i=1Ai is the average level of advertising in the m media products,
and p = 1
m
Pm
i=1 pi is the average (direct) consumer price. Demand for media product
i is thus decreasing in its own price and advertising level, and increasing in those of
its rivals. This reects the fact that the consumers perceive the media products as
(imperfect) substitutes if s > 0.
Without loss of generality, we choose unit size of advertising Ai such that  = 1.
Note that we then have dCi=dAi = dCi=dpi < 0; other things equal, sales of media
product i will fall by the same amount whether the indirect price (Ai) or the direct
price (pi) increases by one unit. We nonetheless show that increased competition
between media rms will a¤ect their choices of direct and indirect prices qualitatively
di¤erently.
The media rms can raise advertising revenue by selling advertising space to
producers of consumer goods. There are n potential advertisers, and we let Aik  0
denote producer ks advertising level in media product i. A producers gross gain
from advertising is naturally increasing in its advertising level and in the number of
media consumers exposed to its advertising. We keep it simple by assuming that the
gross gain equals AikCi, where  > 0measures the strength of the producers benet
from advertising. This implies that the net gain for advertiser k from advertising in
media product i equals
k =
 

mX
i=1
AikCi
!
 
 
mX
i=1
Aikri
!
; k = 1; ::; n: (4)
Below, we consider a two-stage game. At stage 1, the media rms non-cooperatively
set advertising prices (ri) and consumer prices (pi): At stage 2 the advertisers choose
how much advertising space to buy.
It is for instance well known that the disutility of ads (and thus the value of the parameter i in
our model) may di¤er signicantly between newspapers and TV. See Godes et al. (2008) for an
interesting analysis of competition between di¤erent media industries.
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We solve the game by backward induction. Setting @k=@Aik = 0 for the n
advertisers, taking account of (3), and then using Ai =
Pn
k=1Aik;we nd that
demand for advertising at media outlet i equals
Ai =
n
n+ 1
1

[(1  pi)   m (1  s) ri  msr] ; i = 1; :::;m; (5)
where r = 1
m
Pm
i=1 ri is the average advertising price on the m outlets. Note that
since @Ai=@ri < 0, we have a traditional downward-sloping demand curve for ads.
We further see that demand for advertising at media rm i is decreasing in its
consumer price; dAi=dpi < 0. This is an indirect e¤ect, which follows from the
assumption that consumers have downward-sloping demand functions for each media
product. A higher pi thus reduces consumption of media product i, making it less
interesting to advertise in this product.
3 Results
In this section we will apply our model to show how competition may inuence how
media rms raise revenue. We start out by reporting some results that are crucial
for understanding the strategic interaction in this industry.
3.1 The nature of competition
An important insight from the model is that competition on advertising prices is
qualitatively di¤erent from competition on consumer prices. In particular, equation
(5) shows that Ai is decreasing not only in the advertising price charged by me-
dia rm i (@Ai=@ri < 0) but also in the advertising prices charged by the rivals;
@Ai=@rj < 0: To see why, suppose that rj increases. Then the advertising level at
media product j falls, making it relatively more attractive for the audience. Thereby
consumption of the rival media products will be reduced (and more so the closer
substitutes they are), such that they will observe lower demand for advertising.
We are now ready to note the following crucial property of media competition:
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Lemma 1: Advertising prices are strategic substitutes, whereas consumer prices
are strategic complements.
Proof. By inserting for (3) and (5) into (1), we have
d2i
dridrj
=   n
n+ 1
s

< 0; 8j 6= i:
and
d2i
dpidpj
=
1
n+ 1
1
m2
s
1  s > 0; 8j 6= i:
Lemma 1 shows that there is an important di¤erence between the two markets
in which the media rms operate. In the consumer market, an increase in one rms
price would provide the other rms with incentives to increase their prices too. This
is like the normal textbook depiction of price competition. As argued above, things
are quite di¤erent in the advertising market. If media rm i sets a higher advertising
price, it will naturally sell less advertising. However, since advertising is a nuisance
to consumers, consumer demand for media product i will increase while consumer
demand for rival media products will fall. The rivals will consequently experience a
smaller demand for advertising, and thus have incentives to lower their advertising
prices.9
In order to simplify the algebra we shall now make the following assumption:
Assumption: Let n =1 and  = 1:
The consequences of relaxing this assumption are discussed below.
At stage 1, each media rm sets its two prices; one for advertisers and one for
consumers. Maximizing channel is prot in (1), subject to consumer demand in (3)
and advertising demand in (5), we have
di
dri
= 1  2 [m (1  s) + s] ri   s
X
j 6=i
rj; (6)
di
dpi
=
1
m2 (1  s)
"
m (1  s)  2 (m  s) pi + s
X
j 6=i
pj
#
: (7)
9This e¤ect seems to be relatively robust, as it appears in a number of di¤erent frameworks.
See e.g. Nilssen and Sørgard (2001) and Gabszewicz et al. (2004b).
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Equating (6) and (7) to zero for i = 1; :::;m gives rise to a unique, symmetric
equilibrium. By setting ri = r and pi = p 8i, we nd:
r =
1
m (2  s) + s ; (8)
p =
m (1  s)
m (2  s)  s: (9)
Let A and C denote advertising and consumption levels at each media rm in
the symmetric equilibrium. Inserting from (8) and (9) in (3) and (5) yields:
A =
s2 (m  1)
m2 (2  s)2   s2 ; (10)
C =
1
m (2  s) + s: (11)
Equilibrium prot for each media rm can now be shown to equal
 =
m (1  s) + s
[m (2  s) + s]2 : (12)
The parameters s and m can be interpreted as measures of competition among
the TV stations. If s increases, competition becomes tougher because the media
products are less di¤erentiated, while an increase in m implies that competition be-
comes tougher due to a larger number of media rms. It is therefore not surprising
that each media rms prot is decreasing in both of these parameters (d=ds < 0
and d=dm < 0):10 However, the relative importance of advertising revenue com-
pared to consumer payments depends crucially on whether competition increases
due to an increase in s or m: To see this it is useful rst to dene S as the share of
consumer payments in each media rms total revenue:
S =
pC
pC + rA
By inserting for prices and quantities we nd that
S =
(1  s)m [m (2  s) + s]
[m (1  s) + s] [m (2  s)  s] : (13)
10Equation (12) yields ddm =  m(1 s)(2 s)+s(3 s)[m(2 s)+s]3 < 0 and dds =  
s(m 1)2
[m(2 s)+s]3 < 0:
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3.2 The role of product di¤erentiation
Lemma 1 showed that consumer payments are strategic complements, and advertis-
ing prices strategic substitutes. This has important implications for how competition
between media rms works. Competition in strategic complements is more aggres-
sive than competition in strategic substitutes, and more so the less di¤erentiated
the services are (e.g., Bulow, et al., 1985, and Vives, 1999). Intuitively, we should
therefore expect the media rms to rely more on advertising revenue and less on
consumer payments the closer substitutes the consumers perceive the media prod-
ucts to be (the higher s is). This intuition is straight forwardly veried by noting
that equation (13) yields
dS
ds
=   ms (m  1) [m (4  3s) + s]
[m (1  s) + s]2 [m (2  s)  s]2 < 0: (14)
We can thus state our rst main result:
Proposition 1: The share of consumer payment in the media rmstotal rev-
enue is smaller the less di¤erentiated the media products are ( dS=ds < 0).
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1 for m = 2: With our assumption that  = 1;
the gains from selling advertising space are so low compared to the consumers
distaste for ads that a monopoly media rm would prefer to be advertising-free. At
s = 0 the media rms thus raise all their revenue from consumer payments (A = 0
from equation (10)). However, the closer substitutes the media products, the more
the media rms will have to rely on the advertising market to raise revenue. If
s = 1 the media products are perceived as perfect substitutes. At this extreme,
they are unable to charge a price higher than marginal costs on the consumer side
of the market (p = 0 from equation (9)). This follows directly from the result
that consumer prices are strategic complements (and the assumption that all media
rms have the same marginal costs, which we have set equal to zero). However,
since advertising prices are strategic substitutes, the media rms are able to earn a
positive prot in the advertising market even at s = 1:
What if the media rms were able to compete in advertising quantities instead
of advertising prices, i.e. if they can make credible ad quantity commitments?
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Then they would compete in strategic complements also on the advertising side of
the market. Since this is harsher than competition in strategic substitutes, they
will - not surprisingly - have no incentives to make such commitments.11 On the
contrary, if the media rms were able to choose between setting advertising prices
and advertising quantities, it would be a dominant strategy for each rms to compete
in advertising prices.12
0.00
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Consumer Revenue Advertising Revenue
rA, pC
pC
rA
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Figure 1: Revenue from consumers and advertisers.
A few words on how Assumption 1 a¤ects our results may be warranted. First,
the smaller  is; the less protable is clearly the advertising market for the media
rms. Second, it should be noted that n (the number of advertisers) can be in-
terpreted as a proxy for the media rmsmarket power over the advertisers - the
11See the Appendix for a proof with m = 2:
12Godes et al. (2008) assume that the advertisers as well as the consumers perceive the media
products as imperfect substitutes. They show that such an assumption might imply that compe-
tition in the advertising market is weaker than in the consumer market even if the media rms
compete in advertising quantities. More specically, they show that this is true if  > h, where
their parameters  and h measure the degree of product di¤erentiation in the content and the
advertiser market, respectively.
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smaller n is; the less able the media rms are to extract the prot that advertising
generates. Both a lower value of  and a smaller n thus reduce advertising revenue
for the media rms. It nonetheless remains true that as s approaches one, the media
rms can make prot only from the ad market. Letting  < 1 and n < 1 would
thus neither change the result that the media rms prefer to be advertising free as
monopolies nor that they must rely solely on ad revenue if they are perceived as
perfect substitutes.
With  > 1; we must distinguish between two cases: If  is above a critical value
crit; we reach a corner solution where the media rms are raising all their revenues
from advertising, no matter how poor substitutes the media products are. This
corresponds to the underpricing result in Godes et.al. (2008).13 If 1 <  < crit; on
the other hand, the media rms will make prots from both the advertising and the
consumer side of the market for any s 2 [0; 1) : Proposition 1 still holds, though -
advertising revenue is relatively more important for the media rms the higher s is.
In this respect, Assumption 1 is innocent for our qualitative results.
Before ending this section, we should note that equation (11) yields dC=ds =
(m  1) [m (2  s) + s] 2 > 0: This implies:
Corollary 1: Other things equal, consumption of each media product is larger
the closer substitutes they are: dC=ds > 0; i = 1; 2.
To understand the intuition for Corollary 1, note that consumption of each media
product is a¤ected in two opposing ways as s increases: Consumer prices go down,
and this has a positive impact on the size of the audiences. At the same time,
advertising goes up. In isolation, this tends to reduce the sales of the media products.
However, the former e¤ect dominates. The reason for this is simply that an increase
in s means that competition increases, such that the media rmsability to utilize
their market power over the consumer is reduced. Thereby the size of the audiences
is unambiguously higher the closer substitutes the media rms produce, as stated in
Corollary 1. This result is similar to what we typically nd in traditional (one-sided)
13See also Kind, Nilssen and Sørgard (2005), an earlier version of this paper, where it is shown
that underpricing can be present even with a monopoly media rm.
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markets.
In combination, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 predict that media rms that are
mainly advertising nanced have relatively large audiences. However, this is not
because they seek a broader audience as such. On the contrary, a media rm with
large market power would in our model choose high user payments and accept a
relatively small audience. This ts well with the observation that pay-TV channels
and newspapers with few close substitutes typically have high prices and small au-
diences. By the same token, one observes that electronic newspapers with unique
contents are able to charge their visitors directly, but that this reduces the number
of readers.14
Godes et al. (op cit) assume that m  2; and interpret a change of market
structure from monopoly to duopoly as though s changes from zero to a strictly
positive number.15 We agree that this is a reasonable interpretation, since each
media rm has monopoly power if s = 0 but not if s > 0: Consistent with this, we
nd
S(m = 2)  S(m = 1) =   s
2
(4  3s) (2  s) < 0 for s > 0; (15)
which means that sign [dS=ds] = sign [S(m = 2)  S(m = 1)] < 0 if the media
products are imperfect substitutes:
We can state:
Corollary 2: Let m = 2; and assume that the market structure changes from
monopoly ( s = 0) to duopoly ( s > 0). Then the relative importance of advertising
revenue increases.
Note that S(m = 2)   S(m = 1) = 0 if s = 0: Whether we have one or two
media rms thus does not matter per se for the choice of business model. This is
true both in our model and in Godes et al. What matters is instead whether there is
competition between the media rms. If they compete as duopolists, they will rely
relatively more on advertising revenue than if each of them had monopoly power
14This e¤ect would not show up in a standard Hotelling framework, where the total number of
consumers is given. See also the discussion in Section 4.
15In their notation, this amounts to changing from  = 0 to  > 0:
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in its own market segment. However, as demonstrated below, we cannot generalize
from Corollary 2 that the relative importance of advertising revenue is increasing in
the number of competing media rms.
3.3 The role of the number of media products
The results above show that media rms face weaker competition on the advertising
side of the market than on the consumer side. On this background, it might be
tempting to conclude that both an increase in the number of rivals and in the
substitutability between media products will make advertising revenue relatively
more important for the media rms. This is not correct, however. The reason
is that the larger the number of TV channels, say, the smaller is each channels
audience and thus its market power in the advertising market. This implies that the
advertising price will move towards marginal costs as the number of TV channels
increases. In the limit we nd from equation (8) that
lim
m!1
r = 0: (16)
In contrast, the consumers perceive the media products as imperfect substitutes
as long as s < 1: The media rms will therefore have some market power over the
consumers, no matter how many media products there are on the market. This is
formally veried from equation (9):
lim
m!1
p =
1  s
2  s > 0 for s < 1: (17)
Equations (16) and (17) suggest that as the number of media rms increases,
they will to an increasingly large extent have to rely on direct charges from the
consumers. We can state our second main result:
Proposition 2: Assume that m  2 and s 2 (0; 1) : Then the share of con-
sumer payment in each media rms total revenue is higher the larger the number of
rivals; dS=dm > 0.
Proof. From equation (13) we nd
dS
dm
=
s2 (1  s) [m (m  2) (2  s)  s]
[m (1  s) + s]2 [m (2  s)  s]2 > 0,
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where the inequality can be shown to hold for all s 2 (0; 1) and m  3. Inserting
for m = 2 and m = 3 into (13) we further have
S(m = 3)  S(m = 2) = s
2 (1  s)2
(3  2s)2 (2  s) (4  3s) > 0 for s 2 (0; 1) :
As noted in the Introduction, the number of TV channels has increased sharply
over the last decades, while the opposite is true for newspapers. Proposition 2 is
thus consistent with the observation that consumer payments have become increas-
ingly more important for the former, and advertising revenue for the latter. The
Proposition is also consistent with the observation of Godes et al. (2008) that as
the number of content providers has increased on the internet, we have witnessed
more and more pay-for-content sites. One recent example is the Norwegian inter-
net broadcaster TV2 Sumo, which charges consumers a fee for access to its unique
content.16
It could be argued that technological progress is the main reason why TV chan-
nels now rely more on consumer payments than they used to do. We certainly agree
with that claim; it is only with the advent of encrypted digital signals that it has
become possible for TV channels to charge their viewers directly (and it is digital
transmission technologies which have allowed the large increase in the number of
TV channels). However, our model suggests that digitalization of TV signals and
basic economic forces might be complementary factors in explaining the growth of
pay-TV.
Clearly, there is reason to believe that the growth of internet newspapers has
reduced demand for printed newspapers. In this sense it is not surprising that the
number of printed newspapers has declined, raising their dependence on advertising
revenue according to our model. Furthermore, the mechanisms we have highlighted
suggest that their tendency to rely on advertising revenue should increase the better
substitutes the readers consider printed and electronic newspapers to be. However,
a further analysis of this issue requires a more elaborate model, which takes into
16TV2 Sumo o¤ers a menu of tari¤s, where you can subscribe either weekly, montly or annually
or simply pay for watching one particular program. For details, see http://webtv.tv2.no/webtv/.
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consideration the specic characteristics of the two kinds of newspapers, and the
competitive forces within and between these two market segments. There is also a
need for empirical work to analyze how the internet has reduced the willingness to
pay for ads in traditional newspapers relative to the readerswillingness to pay for
printed media.
4 Some concluding remarks
The main purpose of this paper is to show how competitive forces may a¤ect the
way media rms raise revenue. It turns out that competition has an ambiguous
e¤ect on the choice of business model. Tougher competition in the sense of closer
substitutability between the media products makes advertising revenue relatively
more important, while a larger number of media products (e.g. a larger number of
TV channels) increases the relative importance of direct payment from the audience.
Our analysis shows that competition in media markets di¤ers from what we
observe in most other industries. More specically, the two-sided nature of me-
dia markets implies that competition in consumer prices is qualitatively di¤erent
from competition in advertising prices. As is the case in more traditional markets,
consumer prices are strategic complements: if one media rm reduces the price it
charges from its audience, it will be optimal for the other rms to do the same.
Advertising prices, on the other hand, are strategic substitutes; a price reduction
from one rm leads to a price increase from the others. Competition in strategic
complements is generally more aggressive than competition in strategic substitutes,
and more so the less di¤erentiated the products (see Bulow et al., 1985, and Vives,
1999). This explains why we arrive at the result that the closer substitutes the
competing media rmsproducts are, the larger is the fraction of their revenue that
comes from advertising.
A rst crucial assumption underlying our results is that the media rms compete
in prices towards the consumers. This is hardly controversial. More controversial,
though, may our assumption that media rms compete in advertising prices be. It
could be argued that it is more reasonable to assume that media rms set adver-
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tising quantities rather than advertising prices. First, media rms can presumably
relatively easily commit themselves with respect to how much space to allocate to
commercials. Second, media rms may plan in terms of quantities: how many pages
of advertising should there be in a newspaper, and how often should a television
program be interrupted by commercials? In practice, however, there are no physical
limits to how much space media rms can use for advertising. Thus, the rms need
to communicate possibly self-imposed quantity limits to the market. But what we
typically observe is announcement of advertising prices only; it is not common for
printed newspapers to commit to a maximum number of pages with advertising, or
for TV channels to commit to a maximum amount of time for commercials per day.17
Nor do we observe advertisers pay a lower price the more total advertising there is
at a media rm, which could be an indirect way of committing to a lowadvertising
volume. The advertising-price scheme is rather based on, for instance, the size of the
audience and the number of minutes the commercial of a given advertiser is shown.
Godes et al. (2008) provide some examples where media rms signal that their
advertising volume will be relatively low. If these signals are credible, the media
rms may end up competing in advertising quantities. However, since competition
in strategic substitutes is weaker than competition in strategic complements, it is
a dominant strategy in our model for the media rms to compete in advertising
prices rather than advertising quantities. Thus, the rms will not have incentives
to make non-reversible commitments with respect to advertising quantities. Future
empirical and theoretical research should analyze how robust this conclusion is.
The observation that internet newspapers and tv channels which do not o¤er unique
content typically are advertising-nanced, supports our prediction that they compete
in strategic substitutes on the advertising side.18
Finally, it should be noted that our model may be considered as a complement
to research papers on media economics that build on Hotelling and Salop frame-
17However, in some European countries, there is an upper, regulatory limit on how much adver-
tising there can be on TV.
18Godes et al. (op. cit) show that if advertisers perceive e.g. di¤erent TV channels as more
di¤erentiated than do the viewers, competition on the advertising side may still be relatively weak
even with quantity competition.
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works.19 The advantage of the Hotelling framework is that it makes it possible
to endogenize the extent of horizontal di¤erentiation between the media products.
However, a disadvantage of both Hotelling and Salop is that the size of the market
is typically given, such that aggregate output is independent of whether there is any
competition. In our framework, competition leads to higher output, and we believe
that this is a reasonable prediction both in the media industry and in other markets.
The main motivation for our choice of framework, however, is that it allows us to
analyze the consequences of market entry.
5 Appendix
On the dominance of competing in advertising prices
It seems unreasonable to assume that the media rms compete in quantities on
the consumer side. We will thus prove that it is a dominant strategy for the media
rms to compete in advertising prices instead of advertising quantities, given that
they compete in prices on the consumer side.
Assume that there are two media rms; m = 2: If both compete in advertising
prices, we nd from equation (12) that the prot level of each rm is equal to (with
superscripts indicating the media rmschoice variables on the ad side of the market)
r1;r2i =
2  s
(4  s)2 : (18)
Suppose that media rm 1 deviates, and chooses advertising quantity as strate-
gic variable (the results would be symmetric if instead we assumed that the ri-
val deviated). Solving fp1; A1g = argmax1 and fp2; r2g = argmax2 we nd
p1 = p2 =
2(1 s)
4 3s ; r2 =
4 3s
16(1 s)+s2 and A1 =
4s2(1 s)
(4 3s)(16(1 s)+s2) : The media rms will
then have the following prot levels:
A1;r21 =
4 (1  s)2 (4  s)2
(2  s) [16(1  s) + s2]2 and 
A1;r2
2 =
4 (1  s) (4  3s)2
(2  s) [16(1  s) + s2]2 : (19)
Since
A1;r21   r1;r21 =  s3
4 (4  3s)2   3s3
(2  s) (4  s)2 (16(1  s) + s2)2 < 0 for s > 0;
19See e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005), Gabszewicz et al (2004a, 2004b), and Liu et al (2004).
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it is not protable for media rm 1 to deviate from an outcome where both rms
compete in advertising prices.
Suppose next that both rms compete in advertising quantities. Solving fp1; A1g =
argmax1 and fp2; A2g = argmax2 implies that neither of the media rms will
have any advertising, and that p1 = p2 =
2(1 s)
4 3s :
20 The rms then make prots equal
to
A1;A2i =
(1  s) (2  s)
(4  3s)2 :
If media rm 2 deviates and chooses advertising price as strategic variable, we
can solve fp1; A1g = argmax1 and fp2; r2g = argmax2 to nd that A1;r21 and
r2;A12 are given by equation (19). Since 
A1;r2
2   A1;A22 > 0; it is protable for
media rm 2 to deviate.
Summing up, it follows that it is a dominant strategy for both rms to choose
price rather than quantity as the strategic variable in the advertising market. Q.E.D.
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